The ongoing conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not simply a clash between two neighbors. It is the outcome of the Pakistan military-driven diplomacy, one built on crisis, force, and national-security posturing rather than honest dialogue. Four years after the Taliban took over in Kabul, the same Pakistani military and intelligence networks that once welcomed them are now blaming the Taliban for cross-border violence, forcing Afghan refugees from Pakistan, and launching airstrikes and shelling inside Afghanistan. This cycle of largely one-sided violence shows not only a failure in Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy but also a deeper structural issue: when the military controls foreign policy, peace becomes an obstacle rather than a goal.
Back in August 2021, many analysts believed a Taliban-led Afghanistan would give Pakistan a strategic partner in the neighborhood. The Pakistan military saw value in reduced border friction, regional leverage, and a friendly regime in Kabul. Some within Pakistan’s security establishment openly celebrated the Taliban’s return to power as a victory of the long-held “strategic depth” policy. Over time, however, the reality proved sharply different. By late 2025, Pakistan was accusing the Taliban government of harboring militants responsible for suicide bombings and attacks inside Pakistan, including those by the Tehrik‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The result has been a steady escalation of violence and mistrust between the two sides.
In late November 2025, Afghanistan’s Taliban administration claimed that Pakistani airstrikes in eastern provinces killed nine children and a woman. Kabul denounced the strikes as attacks on civilian homes, not militant hideouts. Shortly thereafter, on December 5, a heavy exchange of fire erupted along the border at the Spin Boldak–Chaman crossing. Afghan officials accused Pakistani forces of initiating the clash. The firefight killed at least five people, including Afghan civilians, and wounded others on both sides. The violence came even as negotiators from both sides met in Saudi Arabia under fresh peace talks. Those talks collapsed quickly, unable to overcome entrenched blame and distrust.
This pattern reveals a stark truth that the Pakistan military-driven policy on Afghanistan has wholly failed to bring peace with the Taliban in the last four years. It appears Rawalpindi wants to project strength, orchestrating crises, and using conflict to justify its permanent influence in the country. Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir recently warned the Taliban to choose between friendly ties with Islamabad or support for “terrorist groups,” a thinly veiled threat that highlights how coercion overrides diplomacy in Pakistan.
Beyond violent clashes and airstrikes, another dimension of this conflict is unfolding: the treatment of Afghan refugees inside Pakistan. Since 2023, Islamabad has pursued a sweeping deportation policy under the banner of an “Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan.” Human rights groups warn that these deportations violate international standards and strip long-time residents of their legal protections. By the end of 2025, more than one million Afghans, many of them ethnic Pashtuns who had spent much or all of their lives in Pakistan, will have been forcefully returned to Afghanistan.
For decades, Afghan refugees lived and worked in Pakistan side-by-side with Pakistanis. They contributed to communities, worked in cities or rural areas, and raised families. Now they are being treated as liabilities at best, enemies at worst. With forced deportations already underway and mounting violence across the border, the options for refuge or safe return are shrinking for them. International human-rights groups have raised alarms about Pakistan’s mistreatment of Afghans, forced returns, and violations of asylum norms.
This forced mass repatriation of Afghans has had little to do with due process or refugee protection. Instead, it is part of a broader security-driven policy of the Pakistan military; when tensions with Afghanistan rise, Afghan refugees become scapegoats and bargaining chips to pressure the Taliban administration and humiliate the Pashtun community. That undermines any moral or diplomatic claim Islamabad makes for pursuing “peace” with Afghanistan.
In parallel with forced expulsions, Pakistan’s military has launched a series of airstrikes and artillery retaliation inside Afghanistan in the last four years. The November 2025 strikes in eastern Afghan provinces resulted in civilian deaths and drew sharp condemnations from Kabul and international observers. Because civilian casualties appear inevitable, and no verifiable evidence has been publicly shared about the killings of high-value terrorist leaders, Afghan public anger has grown against Pakistan.
Even within Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, violence persists unabated. In October, the military said it killed 25 militants and five soldiers in clashes near the Afghan border as peace delegations tried to repair ties between the two countries. Pakistan portrayed these operations as decisive military successes. But for local communities on both sides, they represent deepening instability, distrust, and fear.
Part of the problem lies in the structure of decision-making itself. When the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies dictate foreign policy, diplomacy becomes secondary. National security crises, real or imagined, can be used to justify expanded budgets, greater political control, and limited accountability. Peace depends on trust. But if the same institutions benefit from conflict, trust becomes impossible. Therefore, the current Afghanistan-Pakistan strife is not triggered by just a border clash or TTP-led attacks. It indicates a sign of underlying structural failure and intentional efforts to sabotage peace process. The military-led strategy from Islamabad has failed to secure Pakistan’s borders, protect its citizens, or earn any goodwill abroad. Instead, it has provoked widespread suffering, humanitarian crises, and regional instability.
What the situation demands is mature negotiation, mutual acknowledgement of complications, third-party mediation, and long-term planning. It takes humility from Pakistan and an acknowledgment that force cannot fix differences with the Taliban, and that expelling innocent refugees will not solve security concerns, and that civilian lives must be protected above everything else.
But such diplomacy seems unlikely as long as those who benefit from instability continue to control events in Pakistan. Therefore, the South Asia region should prepare for increased deadly clashes, more refugee surges, and cycles of vengeance driven by the Pakistan military establishment. The ongoing Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict is mainly created and sustained by a military-led diplomacy that avoids accountability and thrives on chaos.